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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ashley Sanquist contends the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress
the evidence in this case, which was found as a result of an unlawfully-prolonged detention. In
direct contravention of Idaho Supreme Court precedent, the State contends the arguments she has
made on appeal about why the detention was unlawfully prolonged were not preserved by her
motion to suppress on that basis. Additionally, in arguing the merits of the issue, the State
ignores the Court of Appeals’ precedent which is directly on point, and which reveals the State’s
arguments to be unfounded.

Since the State’s arguments are contrary to the applicable

precedent, this Court should reject those arguments, reverse the order denying Ms. Sanquist’s
motion to suppress that evidence, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Sanquist’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Sanquist’s motion to suppress the evidence
discovered as a result of an unlawfully-extended detention.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Sanquist’s Motion To Suppress The Evidence
Discovered As A Result Of An Unlawfully-Extended Detention

A.

Ms. Sanquist’s Arguments About Why The Detention Was Unlawfully Prolonged Were
Preserved By Her Motion To Suppress The Evidence Which Was Found During An
Unlawfully-Prolonged Detention
Ms. Sanquist filed a timely motion to suppress the evidence officers found under her foot

for the reason that it was found during an unlawfully-extended detention which was not
connected to the initial purpose of the stop (a report of two unknown, and thus, suspicious,
people). (R., pp.76, 79.) On appeal, she continues to argue that evidence should be suppressed
because it was found during an unlawfully-extended detention. (See generally App. Br.) In her
argument on appeal, she explained the reason why the continued detention was not related to the
initial purpose of the stop, and thus, the reason why the detention was unlawfully extended, was
that the initial justification for the detention (the presence of unknown suspicious persons)
dissipated when the officers received information from dispatch corroborating the identifications
Ms. Sanquist and the other passenger in the car had given the officers. (App. Br., pp.8-14.) The
State believes that this explanation of why the extension of the detention was not related to the
initial purpose of the stop was not sufficiently preserved below. (Resp. Br., p.5.) The Idaho
Supreme Court recently flatly rejected that argument in Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke
View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, ___, 395 P.3d 357, 361 n.2 (2017).
In Brooke View, the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) took the position in the
district court that certain damages in the case were not recoverable as “just compensation.” Id.
ACHD repeatedly argued that the district court should not award those damages. Id. On appeal,
ACHD continued to pursue that issue, but added an argument that the district court had
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improperly interpreted the statute defining “just compensation.” Id. Brooke View argued that
ACHD’s statutory construction argument had not been preserved in its arguments to the district
court, and so, believed those arguments should not be considered on appeal. Id. The Supreme
Court rejected that argument, holding “Brooke View’s position is without merit.”

Id.

It

explained that “[t]here is no question that ACHD clearly raised the relevant issue before the
district court. ACHD’s specific arguments in support of its position may have evolved since the
trial, but the issues on appeal and ACHD’s position with respect to them remain the same.” Id.
Therefore, the Court concluded the issue, and all the attendant arguments, were properly raised
on appeal. Id.
The defining difference between Brooke View and Garcia-Rodriguez, which the State
cites, is that, in Brooke View, the issue of what constitutes “just compensation” had been
discussed to some extent in the district court, whereas, in Garcia-Rodriguez, the issue of whether
the exception to the Fourth Amendment under Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), was
applicable in that case had not been discussed at all in the district court. Compare Brooke View,
395 P.3d at 361 n.2; with State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704
(2017). Thus, in Brooke View, the arguments attendant to the issue – what constitutes “just
compensation” – were preserved for appeal, whereas, in Garcia-Rodriguez, the arguments
attendant to the issue – the Moore exception – were not preserved for appeal. It is the difference
between adding support to the argument on appeal and bringing up a new alternative justification
for the argument on appeal.
The State’s argument in this case is without merit for the same reason Brooke View’s
argument was without merit. Like ACHD, Ms. Sanquist raised the issue of whether the evidence
under her foot should have been suppressed to the district court, taking the position that the
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evidence should be suppressed because it was found during an unlawfully-extended detention
which was not related to the justification for her initial detention – the report of suspicious
unknown persons. (R., pp.76, 79.) She argued that position during the hearing on her motion,
and she expressly reserved her right to challenge the district court’s decision to the contrary on
appeal. (R., pp.79, 92; Tr., Vol.2, p.18, L.8 - p.22, L.5.) Thus, there is no question that she, like
ACHD, raised the relevant issue before the district court. Furthermore, her rationale for why that
issue should be resolved in her favor has not changed – it is still because that evidence was found
during an unlawfully-extended detention. (App. Br., pp.8-14.) On appeal, she, like ACHD, has
simply provided additional analysis as to why the district court’s contrary decision on that issue
was error. Therefore, as in Brooke View, the fact that the specific arguments in support of that
position may have evolved does not mean the issue was not preserved for appeal. As such, the
State’s preservation argument should be rejected for the same reasons the Idaho Supreme Court
held Brooke View’s argument to be meritless.

B.

Based On The Totality of the Circumstances Known To The Officers At The Moment
They Prolonged The Detention, There Was No Reasonable Suspicion To Continue The
Detention
The State’s argument on the merits of this issue boils down to a simple contention – that,

because the information Ms. Sanquist and her companion gave the officers was, in fact, false,
their suspicion of that information was reasonable. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., p.10 (“Arnold and
Sanquist both gave different false names for Arnold. The district court properly concluded that
the officers reasonably suspected, and then developed probable cause, to believe” that
information about the companion’s identity was false, and because they ultimately learned that
the information was false, they were properly investigating a crime during the period of extended
detention); see generally Resp. Br., pp.6-10.) That argument puts the cart before the horse, since
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it is all based on the actual falsity of the information given, a fact which, at the moment the
officers decided to continue the detention, they did not know.
In fact, the totality of the circumstances known at that moment reveals that the police
database had corroborated the information each woman gave about her own identity.
Furthermore, the officers essentially admitted their suspicion of the information given was not
reasonable when they agreed that the lone inconsistency in the profile for the name
Ms. Sanquist’s companion had given could just as easily be due to clerical errors. (Defense
Exhibit A, clip 1179971, ~13:21.) Therefore, the only basis the officers had to disbelieve the
information they had been given was their subjective disbelief of the information.
However, “the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective
justification.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Neither of the remaining facts –
the companion’s nervousness and Ms. Sanquist’s guess about her companion’s last name –
creates the requisite objective justification for the officers to continue detaining Ms. Sanquist.
Nervousness, for example, does not create reasonable suspicion because it is an ordinary reaction
for a person confronted by police. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, ___, 367 P.3d 1231, 1236
(Ct. App. 2016). Similarly, though Ms. Sanquist said her companion’s last name was “Bruss,”
she explained she was not sure about that. (See Defense Exhibit A, clip 1180013, ~3:54-4:56,
6:44.)

In the totality of the circumstances, Ms. Sanquist’s mistaken guess was not an

objectively-reasonable basis to question the validity of the name the companion gave for herself,
particularly when the name the companion had given for herself had been corroborated by the
police database.
Thus, the State’s argument is contrary to the applicable standard, since it is not evaluating
the totality of the circumstances actually known to the officers at the time the detention was
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extended. Rather, the State is trying to justify the officers’ otherwise-unreasonable actions with
the benefit of hindsight, which, of course, is improper. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S.
237, 249 (2013) (“And still more fundamentally, we do not evaluate probable cause in hindsight,
based on what a search does or does not turn up.”); State v. Lewis, 107 Idaho 616, 620-21 (1984)
(“The mere fact that we know, from hindsight, that contraband did exist on premises is no
justification for an officer’s having conducted an illegal search without a warrant.”) As the
Idaho Supreme Court has succinctly summarized, the determination of reasonableness “is made
based upon the facts known to the police at the time, not upon 20/20 hindsight” based on what
they ultimately discovered during the unlawful search. State v. Kofoed, 147 Idaho 296, 298
(2009).
A proper evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in this case reveals that, at the
moment the officers decided to continue detaining Ms. Sanquist and her companion, the only
information the officers had was that their database corroborated the information the women had
given, as it returned valid profiles for both women. Therefore, whatever lingering suspicions
about those responses they might have had were inchoate at best; they amounted to nothing more
than a hunch. 1
In fact, the Court of Appeals essentially answered the question posited by this case in
State v. Zapp, a case which the State flatly ignores. (See generally Resp. Br.) In Zapp, officers
were skeptical of the information the defendant had initially given them about the suspect’s
identity. State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 725 (Ct. App. 1985). They were actually able to verify

1

Though the State contends it does not have to identify what crime the officers reasonably
suspected, (Resp. Br., p.12), the fact remains that, once the officers corroborated the names they
had been given, there were no specific or articulable facts, known to the officers at that time,
which tended to indicate any criminal activity was afoot.
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those suspicions, as they learned that the initial information was false from the suspect’s
subsequently-revealed driver’s license. Id. The officers then ran that second set of information
with the police database, and it corroborated his identity, returning with no warrants known for
the suspect. Id. In the totality of those circumstances, despite the fact that the police actually
knew the information they had originally been given was false, the Court of Appeals still held the
officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to search the bag the suspect was carrying as part of
an investigatory detention after they verified the information he had ultimately given. Id.
Zapp controls the analysis in Ms. Sanquist’s case because, as in Zapp, the officers had
verified the information they were given against the police database. As such, any lingering
suspicion about the falsity of the information given to them was unreasonable. See id. Under the
controlling precedent, therefore, the officers’ decision to extend the detention of Ms. Sanquist to
conduct an investigation into an unreasonable suspicion was unlawful. Id.; see also State v.
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 888 (Ct. App. 1995).
Although the State did not address Zapp, it did try to distinguish Brandstetter. (See
Resp. Br., p.8.) However, that argument is not persuasive given a proper understanding of the
decision in Brandstetter.

What Brandstetter holds is that, if the officers are only seeking

information, rather than already investigating a particular crime, then a person is under no
obligation to give a response. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888. Because there is no obligation to
respond, if a person gives a false answer in such a case, that does not constitute “obstruction”
under I.C. § 18-705 because it does not delay the investigation any more than her silence would
have. Id.
The officers were not investigating a crime when Officer Cannon asked Ms. Sanquist
what her companion’s last name was, and so, Ms. Sanquist was not in a situation where she was
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obligated to respond. Therefore, under Brandstetter, even though her guess at her companion’s
last name was erroneous, it did not constitute obstruction under Idaho’s statute because
Ms. Sanquist’s answer did not delay the officers’ investigation any more than her silence would
have. That her answer caused no delay is particularly evident from the fact that her companion
gave Officer Johnson a name which actually led him to her profile in the police database.
Therefore, that response did not give the officers an objectively-reasonable basis to continue
detaining her to try to investigate an obstruction charge. Thus, the State’s attempt to distinguish
Brandstetter is mistaken.
The State also asserts in a footnote that Brandstetter is no longer viable in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brogan,2 though it does not cite, much less argue, the
standard for departing from prior precedent. (See generally Resp. Br., p.8 n.1.) Moreover, the
State’s argument is wrong because the decisions in Brogan and Brandstetter were based on the
interpretation of different statutes. Therefore, the result in one has no impact on the validity of
the result in the other.
Specifically, Brogan was interpreting whether a false response was criminalized by
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 400-01. It concluded that, because of the broad
language of that statute, it did, in fact, encompass such conduct.3 Id. Since the Brogan Court
found no contrary right to make an “exculpatory no” statement, 4 it held the conviction under

2

Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1998)
Justice Ginsburg remarked on the extraordinary broadness of § 1001 in her concurring opinion.
Though she agreed the false statement in that case fell within the express language of § 1001, she
concluded “[i]t is doubtful Congress intended § 1001 to cast so large a net,” given how far such
statements were removed from the problem Congress was trying to address with that statute.
Brogan, 522 U.S. at 408-12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
4
Ms. Sanquist does not claim that there is such a right. (See generally App. Br.) Rather, she
only cited Brandstetter for the proposition that a false answer in a case like hers does not give the
officers the ability to detain her to investigate the crime of obstruction since, according to
3

9

§ 1001 was appropriate. Id. (explaining the circuits had split on whether such an “exculpatory
no” statement was “exclude[d] from the scope of § 1001”); see, e.g., United States v. Phillipos,
849 F.3d 464, 475 n.2 (1st Cir. 2017) (reaffirming that the decision in Brogan was based on the
plain language of § 1001).
Brandstetter was also looking at statutory language, but reached the opposite conclusion
given the language of Idaho’s statute: “Brandstetter’s making of an unsworn false oral statement
to the police was not an obstruction of an officer within the meaning of I.C. § 18-705.”
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888. Therefore, since the conclusions in Brogan and Brandstetter
were dictated by the language of two different statutes, the fact that they reached opposite
conclusions does not mean that Brogan called Brandstetter into doubt.

See, e.g., United

States v. Binette, 945 F.Supp.2d 223, 230 (D. Mass. 2013) (refusing to extend Brogan for this
reason); In Re Attorney’s Fees of Mohr, 32 P.3d 647, 655 (Haw. 2001) (same). To that point, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has continued to rely on Brandstetter’s interpretation of Idaho’s statute
despite Brogan. State v. Cabrera, Not Reported in P.3d, 2015 WL 404582, pp.2-4 (Ct. App.
2015) (rejecting the district court’s attempt to distinguish Brandstetter on Fifth Amendment
grounds); State v. Meadows, Not Reported in P.3d, 2012 WL 9494159, p.8 n.2 (Ct. App. 2012)
(calling the viability of the State’s theory – that an “exculpatory no” could be the basis of an
obstruction conviction in Idaho – “questionable” because of Brandstetter).5

Brandstetter, her conduct does not fall within Idaho’s statutory prohibition against obstruction.
(App., Br., pp.9, 12.)
5
Ms. Sanquist does not cite Meadows or Cabrera as authority dictating a particular result in this
case, but instead, merely provides them as historical examples of how a learned court has viewed
the continuing viability of the decision in Brandstetter. Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate
Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611,
617 (1991)) (“When this Court had cause to consider unpublished opinions from other
jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we found the
presentation of the unpublished opinions as ‘quite appropriat[e].’ Likewise, we find the hearing
10

Ultimately, under the applicable precedent, the officers did not have an objectivelyreasonable basis to continue detaining Ms. Sanquist after the information she and her companion
gave in regard to their identities was corroborated by the police database. As a result, the
decision to prolong the detention was unlawful. Therefore, any evidence discovered during that
unlawfully-prolonged detention, such as the evidence found under Ms. Sanquist’s shoe, should
have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Sanquist respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her motion to
suppress, vacate her conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

officer’s consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example,
was appropriate.”).
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